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Abstract
We argue that it is possible to adapt the approach of imposing restrictions on available
plans through ﬁnitely effective debt constraints, introduced by Levine and Zame (1996),
to encompass models with default and collateral. Along this line, we introduce in the
setting of Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez (2002) and Páscoa and Seghir (2008) the
concept of almost ﬁnite-time solvency. We show that the conditions imposed in these
two papers to rule out Ponzi schemes implicitly restrict actions to be almost ﬁnite-time
solvent. We deﬁne the notion of equilibrium with almost ﬁnite-time solvency and look on
sufﬁcient conditions for its existence. Assuming a mild assumption on default penalties,
namely that agents are myopic with respect to default penalties, we prove that existence
is guaranteed (and Ponzi schemes are ruled out) when actions are restricted to be almost
ﬁnite-time solvent. The proof is very simple and intuitive. In particular, the main existence
results in Araujo et al. (2002) and Páscoa and Seghir (2008) are simple corollaries of our
existence result.
JEL Classiﬁcation: D52, D91
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1 Introduction
A central issue that arises in sequential markets models with an inﬁnite horizon is the nature
of the borrowing constraints imposed on the participants of the economy. This problem has
no counterpart in ﬁnite horizon economies, since the requirement that agents must balance
their debts at the terminal date implies limits on debt at earlier dates. In the absence of a
terminal date agents will seek to renew their credit by successively postponing the repayment
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1of their debts until inﬁnite. The existence of such schemes (so-called Ponzi schemes) causes
agents’ decision problem to have no solution even in cases where the system of prices does not
offer (local) arbitrage opportunities. Therefore, for an equilibrium to exist when time extends
to inﬁnite, one must impose a mechanism (i.e., specify borrowing constraints) that limits the
rate at which agents accumulate debt, namely that avoids the existence of Ponzi schemes.
Roughly speaking, three approaches have been proposed in the literature to deal with the
speciﬁcation of debt constraints in inﬁnite horizon sequential markets models. The crucial
difference among these lines of research hinges on the speciﬁc assumptions made about the
enforcement of payments (the possibility of default) as well as the proposed default punish-
ment.
The ﬁrst approach, due to Magill and Quinzii (1994), Levine and Zame (1996) and
Hernández and Santos (1996), assumes full enforcement of payments (i.e., default is not al-
lowed). Magill and Quinzii (1994) argue for self-imposed debt constraints that prevent agents
from considering trading strategies that lead to unlimited debt. In Magill and Quinzii (1994)
the budget constraint is deﬁned according to a particular set of subjective current value price
processes. The problem with this characterization of budget sets is that this set of personal-
ized prices is somehow related to marginal utilities which are not typically observable objects
and therefore cannot be monitored by an agency. The speciﬁcation of budget sets proposed by
Hernández and Santos (1996) does not suffer from this weakness since the valuation operator
takes into account the whole set of non-arbitrage price systems. Levine and Zame (1996) (See
also Levine and Zame (2002)) offer an alternative formulation, based on the idea that at each
node, all the debt can be repaid in ﬁnite time, that is, they require the debt constrains to be
ﬁnitely effective. The formulation makes perfect sense in an incomplete markets setting, and
it has the nice characteristic that a broad class of debt constraints are equivalent or reduced
to the ﬁnitely effective debt constraints.1
The second approach builds on the work of Kehoe and Levine (1993), Zhang (1997) and
Alvarez and Jermann (2000). In this framework default is permitted but there is a tough
punishment for it: if agents do not honor their debts, they are excluded from participating in
the credit markets in future periods. In such a framework the authors focus on constraints
(so-called participating constraints) that are tight enough to prevent default at equilibrium but
simultaneously to allow as much risk sharing as possible.
The ﬁnal approach argues for debt constraints that do not necessarily imply full enforce-
ment of payment at equilibrium, namely it treats default as an equilibrium phenomenon. In
Araujo et al. (2002) and Kubler and Schmedders (2003) borrowers are required to consti-
tute collateral either in terms of durable goods or in terms of physical ﬁnancial assets which
are in positive net supply and cannot be sold short (e.g., Lucas’ trees). When the repos-
session of collateral is the only enforcement mechanism, then an equilibrium always exists.
Combining short-sales with the purchase of collateral constitutes a joint operation that yields
1See Levine and Zame (1996) Section 5 and Hernández and Santos (1996) Section 3.
2non-negative returns. By non-arbitrage, the price of the collateral exceeds the price of the
asset. Therefore, agents cannot transfer wealth from tomorrow to the current period and in
that way Ponzi schemes are ruled out.
In a recent paper, Páscoa and Seghir (2008) have shown that Ponzi schemes may reap-
pear in collateralized economies when there is an additional enforcement mechanism besides
collateral guarantees. The additional enforcement mechanism in Páscoa and Seghir (2008)
takes the form of the linear utility penalties introduced by Shubik and Wilson (1977) and
used, among others by Dubey and Shubik (1979), Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik (1990),
Zame (1993), Araujo, Monteiro and Páscoa (1996), Araujo, Monteiro and Páscoa (1998) and
Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik (2005). Default penalties might be interpreted as the con-
sequence in terms of utility of extra-economic punishment such as prison terms or pangs of
conscience. Páscoa and Seghir (2008) proved that existence of equilibria is compatible only
with moderate default penalties. Harsh default penalties may induce payments besides the
value of the collateral leading to Ponzi schemes. In the same spirit Revil and Torres-Martínez
(2007) show that the non-existence result established in Páscoa and Seghir (2008) goes be-
yond the speciﬁc enforcement mechanism these authors consider. Existence of Ponzi-schemes
is consistent with any other enforcement mechanism that is effective, i.e., it enforces payments
besides the value of the collateral.
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, our aim is to show that there is a close rela-
tion between the budget sets deﬁned by ﬁnitely effective debt constraints (Levine and Zame
(1996)), and the budget sets deﬁned through collateral obligations (Araujo et al. (2002) and
Páscoa and Seghir (2008)). In that respect, we link two approaches that have been considered
to be distinct to each other. Finitely effective debt constraints are relevant in models where
payments can be fully enforced. However, when full enforcement is not possible, requiring
ﬁnite-time solvency does not make sense since agents can default at any period. We appropri-
ately modify the deﬁnition of ﬁnitely effective debt constraints to encompass economies with
default. When payments are fully enforced, our concept of ﬁnite effective debt coincides with
the concept introduced by Levine and Zame (1996). We subsequently show that the condi-
tions imposed in Araujo et al. (2002) and Páscoa and Seghir (2008) implicitly restrict actions
to be almost ﬁnite-time solvent.
Equipped with the appropriate deﬁnition of debt constraints our second objective is to
show the existence of what we term equilibrium with almost ﬁnite-time solvency. Assuming a
mild assumption on default penalties, namely that agents are myopic with respect to default
penalties, we prove that existence is guaranteed (i.e., Ponzi schemes are ruled out) when
actions are restricted to be almost ﬁnite-time solvent. The proof is very simple and intuitive.
Moreover, it turns out that the existence results in Araujo et al. (2002) and Páscoa and Seghir
(2008) are straightforward corollaries of our existence result.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we set out the model, notation and stan-
dard equilibrium concept. Section 3 contains the assumptions imposed on the characteristics
of the economy. In Section 4 we present and discuss the new constraint we imposed on bud-
3get feasible plans. We deﬁne the concept of competitive equilibrium with almost ﬁnite-time
solvency and highlight its relation with the other equilibrium concepts introduced in Araujo
et al. (2002) and Páscoa and Seghir (2008). Section 5 is devoted to the main condition we
impose on default penalties: myopia of agents and we prove in Section 6 that this condition
is sufﬁcient for existence of a competitive equilibrium with almost ﬁnite-time solvency.
2 The Model
The model is essentially the one developed in Araujo et al. (2002). We consider a stochastic
economy E with an inﬁnite horizon.
2.1 Uncertainty and time
Let T = f0,1,...,t,...g denote the set of time periods and let S be a (inﬁnite) set of states of
nature. The available information at period t in T is the same for each agent and is described
by a ﬁnite partition Ft of S. Information is revealed along time, i.e., the sequence (Ft)t2T is
increasing. Every pair (t,) where  is a set in Ft is called a node. The set of all nodes is
denoted by D and is called the event tree. We assume that there is no information at t = 0
and we denote by 0 = (0,S) the initial node. If  = (t,) belongs to the event tree, then t is
denoted by t(). We say that 0 = (t0,0) is a successor of  = (t,) if t0 ¾ t and 0  ; we
use the notation 0 ¾ . We denote by + the set of immediate successors deﬁned by
+ = f0 2 D : t(0) = t()+1g.
Because Ft is ﬁner than Ft 1 for every t > 0, there is a unique node   in D such that 
is an immediate successor of  . Given a period t 2 T we denote by Dt the set of nodes at
period t, i.e., Dt = f 2 D : t() = tg. The set of nodes up to period t is denoted by Dt, i.e.,
Dt = f 2 D : t() ¶ tg.
2.2 Agents and commodities
There exists a ﬁnite set L of durable commodities available for trade at every node  2 D.
Depreciation of goods is represented by a family (Y())2D of linear functionals Y() from
RL
+ to RL
+. The bundle Y()z is obtained at node  if the bundle z 2 RL
+ is consumed at node
 . At each node there are spot markets for trading every good. We let p = (p())2D be the
spot price process where p() = (p(,`))`2L 2 RL
+ is the price vector at node .
There is a ﬁnite set I of inﬁnitely lived agents. Each agent i 2 I is characterized by an
endowment process !i = (!i())2D where !i() = (!i(,`))`2L 2 RL
+ is the endowment
available at node . Each agent chooses a consumption process x = (x())2D where x() 2
4RL
+. We denote by X the set of consumption processes. The utility function Ui : X  ! [0,+1]





where ui : R+  ! [0,1).
Remark 2.1. As in Araujo et al. (2002), we allow Ui(x) to be inﬁnite for some consumption
process x in X. In Levine and Zame (1996) and Levine and Zame (2002), the consumption
set is restricted to uniformly bounded from above consumption processes and the function Ui
is assumed to have ﬁnite values.
2.3 Assets and collateral
There is a ﬁnite set J of short-lived real assets available for trade at each node. For each asset
j, the bundle yielded at node  is denoted by A(, j) 2 RL
+. We let q = (q())2D be the asset
price process where q() = (q(, j))j2J 2 RJ
+ represents the asset price vector at node . At
each node , denote by i() 2 RJ
+ the vector of purchases and denote by 'i() the vector of
short-sales at node .
Following Araujo et al. (2002) (see also Geanakoplos (1997) and Geanakoplos and Zame
(2002)), assets are collateralized in the sense that for every unit of asset j sold at a node ,
agents should buy a collateral C(, j) 2 RL
+ that protects lenders in case of default. Implicitly
we assume that payments can be enforced only through the seizure of the collateral. At a
node , agent i should deliver the promise V(p,)i( ) where
V(p,) = (V(p,, j))j2J and V(p,, j) = p()A(, j).
However, agent i may decide to default and chooses a delivery di(, j) in units of account.
Since the collateral can be seized, this delivery must satisfy
di(, j) ¾ D(p,, j)'i( , j)
where
D(p,, j) = minfp()A(, j),p()Y()C( , j)g.
Following Dubey et al. (2005), we assume that agent i feels a disutility i
j(s) 2 [0,+1] from









where v() 2 RL
++ is exogenously speciﬁed.
5In that case, agent i may have an incentive to deliver more than the minimum between
his debt and the depreciated value of his collateral, i.e., we may have
di(, j) > D(p,, j)'i( , j).
The possibility of default forces us to add delivery rates () = ((, j))j2J. Each asset j
delivers to lenders the fraction V(,p,, j) per unit of asset purchased deﬁned by
V(,p,, j) = (, j)V(p,, j)+(1 (, j))D(p,, j).
2.4 Solvency constraints
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0 )) = (0,0,0,0).







¶ p()[!i()+ Y()xi( )]+ V(,p,)i( )+q()'i(), (2.1)
(b) collateral requirement:
C()'i() ¶ xi(), (2.2)
(c) minimum delivery
8j 2 J, di(, j) ¾ D(p,, j)'i( , j). (2.3)
62.5 The payoff function
Assume that  = (p,q,) is a process of prices and delivery rates. Consider that agent i has

















We would like to deﬁne the payoff i(p,a) of the plan a as the following difference
i(p,a) = Ui(x) W i(p,a).
Unfortunately, i(p,a) may not be well-deﬁned if both Ui(x) and W i(p,a) are inﬁnite. We
propose to consider the binary relation i,p deﬁned on A by
e a p,i a () 9" > 0, 9T 2 N, 8t ¾ T, i,t(p,e a) ¾ i,t(p,a)+"
where
















Observe that if i(p,e a) and i(p,a) exist in R then
e a p,i a () i(p,e a) > i(p,a).
The set Prefi(p,a) of plans strictly preferred to plan a by agent i is deﬁned by
Prefi(p,a) = fe a 2 A : e a i,p ag.
2.6 The equilibrium concept
We denote by  the set of prices and delivery rates (p,q,) satisfying
8 2 D, p() 2 RL
++, q() 2 RJ






q(, j) = 1.
We denote by cl the closure of  under the weak topology.2
Given a process (p,q,) of commodity prices, asset prices and delivery rates, we denote
by Bi(p,q,) the set of plans a = (x,,',d) 2 A satisfying constraints (2.1), (2.2) and (2.3).
The demand di(p,q,) is deﬁned by
di(p,q,) = fa 2 Bi(p,q,) : Prefi(p,a)\ Bi(p,q,) = ;g.
Deﬁnition 2.1. A competitive equilibrium for the economy E is a family of prices and delivery
rates (p,q,) 2  and an allocation a = (ai)i2I with ai 2 A such that
(a) for every agent i, the plan ai is optimal, i.e.,
ai 2 di(p,q,),























(d) deliveries match at every node, i.e., for all  6= 0 and all j 2 J,
X
i2I




The set of allocations a = (ai)i2I in A satisfying the market clearing conditions (b) and
(c) is denoted by F. Each allocation in F is called physically feasible. A plan ai 2 A is called
physically feasible if there exists a physically feasible allocation b such that ai = bi. The set of
physically feasible plans is denoted by Fi. We denote by Eq(E) the set of competitive equilibria
for the economy E.
2The process (p,q,) belongs to cl if the condition p() 2 RL
++ in (2.4) is replaced by p() 2 RL
+.
83 Assumptions
For each agent i, we denote by 
i = (
i())2D the process of accumulated endowments,
deﬁned recursively by







i of accumulated aggregate endowments is denoted by 
. This section
describes the assumptions imposed on the characteristics of the economy. It should be clear
that these assumptions always hold throughout the paper.
Assumption 3.1 (Agents). For every agent i,













(A.2) for every node , the utility function ui(,) is concave, continuous and strictly increas-
ing with ui(,0) = 0,
(A.3) the inﬁnite sum Ui(
) is ﬁnite.
Assumption 3.2 (Commodities). For every node  the depreciation function Y() is not zero.
Assumption 3.3 (Financial assets). For every asset j and node , the collateral C(, j) is not
zero.
Remark 3.1. Assumptions (3.1), (3.2) and (3.3) are classical in the literature of inﬁnite hori-
zon models with collateral requirements (see e.g., Araujo et al. (2002) and Páscoa and Seghir
(2008)).
Remark 3.2. Observe that Assumptions (A.2) and (A.3) imply that when restricted to the order
interval [0,
], the function Ui is weakly continuous. For the sake of completeness, we give
the straightforward proof in Appendix A.1.
We recall a particular case of our framework that is widely used in the literature (see e.g.
Araujo and Sandroni (1999)).
Deﬁnition 3.1. The economy E is said standard if Assumptions (3.1), (3.2) and (3.3) are
satisﬁed and if for each agent i, there exists
(S.1) a discount factor i 2 (0,1),
(S.2) a sequence (Pi
t)t¾1 of beliefs about nodes at period t represented by a probability Pi
t 2
Prob(Dt),
9(S.3) an instantaneous felicity function vi : D RL
+ ! [0,1),
(S.4) an instantaneous default penalty i(, j) 2 (0,1) for each node  > 0,
such that for each node  2 D,
ui(,) = [i]t()Pi
t()()vi(,)
for each j 2 J,
i(, j) = [i]t()Pi
t()()i(, j)






4 Almost ﬁnite-time solvent plans
Observe that if i(, j) is zero for every asset j at every node , then our model reduces to the
one in Araujo et al. (2002). In this setting equilibrium always exists. Combining short-sales
with the purchase of collateral constitutes a joint operation that yields non-negative returns.
By non-arbitrage, the price of the collateral exceeds the price of the asset. Therefore, agents
cannot transfer wealth from tomorrow to the current period and Ponzi schemes are ruled out.
In a recent paper, Páscoa and Seghir (2008) proved that harsh default penalties may induce
effective payments over collateral requirements and lead to Ponzi schemes.
When the default penalty is inﬁnite and the collateral requirement is zero, our model re-
duces to the standard one as in Magill and Quinzii (1994) and Levine and Zame (1996). If no
additional (possibly endogenous) debt constraints were imposed, then an equilibrium could
not possibly exist: all traders would attempt to ﬁnance unbounded levels of consumption by
unbounded levels of borrowing. Levine and Zame (1996) (see also Levine and Zame (2002))
formalize the so-called ﬁnitely effective debt constraints by requiring that agents should be
capable of repaying almost all the debt in ﬁnite time.
We propose to adapt in our setting these endogenous debt constraints. Fix a process
 = (p,q,) of prices and delivery rates. At the initial node 0, agent i makes plans for
inﬁnite consumption and investment. Consider the case where agent i anticipates (or fears)
that, at every possible node , his demand for credits at this node may be questioned by an
authority. In order to convince this authority that he is reliable, he must prove that he can pay
back his debt in at most a ﬁnite number of periods after t(), i.e., he must prove that there
is a possible plan of consumption and investment from period t() + 1 to T ¾ t() + 1 such
that, at the virtually terminal node T, he does not need to ask for new loans in order to pay
his debt. More formally, we may consider the following deﬁnition.
10Deﬁnition 4.1. A plan a 2 Bi(p,q,) is said to have ﬁnitely effective debt, if for each period
t ¾ 0, there exists a period T > t and a plan b a also in the budget set Bi(p,q,) such that
(i) up to period t both plans coincide, i.e.,
8 2 Dt, b a() = a(),
(ii) at every node in period T, there is solvency without new loans, i.e.,
8 2 DT, b '() = 0,
(iii) the plan b a is a T-horizon plan, i.e.,
8 2 D, t() > T =) b a() = 0.
Consider the following notation. If a is a plan in A and t is a period, we denote by a1[0,t]
the plan in At which coincides with a for every node  2 Dt. In other words, a plan a has a
ﬁnitely effective debt if for each period t ¾ 0, there exists a subsequent period T > t and a
plan b a such that
b a 2 Bi(p,q,)\ BT and a1[0,t] = b a1[0,t]
where BT is the set of plans a in A satisfying
8 2 DT, '() = 0 and 8 2 D, t() ¾ T +1 =) a() = (0,0,0,0).
This concept was introduced by Levine and Zame (1996) for models without default, i.e.,
models for which the ﬁnancial authority can enforce payments: it may force agents to sell
their current and future endowments (by short-selling assets). However, when the authority
is not capable of enforcing payments, imposing ﬁnitely effective debt constraints does not
make sense since agents can default at any period. Indeed, let a = (x,,',d) be a plan in
Bi(p,q,) and t be any period. Consider the plan b a deﬁned by




a() if t() ¶ t
(!i(),0,0,D(p,)'( )) if t() = t +1
(0,0,0,0) if t() > t +1.
This plan belongs to the budget set Bi(p,q,) and coincides with a on every node up to
period t.
In our framework, enforcement mechanisms are limited to the seizure of collateral. Agents
can always default up to the minimum value between their debt and the depreciated value of
11their collateral. Therefore, there is no room for an authority to control debt along time. We
propose another interpretation of endogenous debt constraints. Assume that the authority has
the legal ability, when the debt carried out by an agent becomes larger and larger, to impose
at any period t that agents can participate in the ﬁnancial market only for a ﬁnite number
 of periods after t. Assume that a negotiation is possible between agents and the ﬁnancial
authority such that the number  of periods can be chosen by agents. Each agent anticipates
this possibility and behaves accordingly in the following sense. When making a plan ai, agent
i takes in consideration that the ﬁnancial authority may force him, at any period t, to stay in
the ﬁnancial market no more than a ﬁnite number  of periods, i.e., at date T = t +, agent
i must leave the market. Therefore, agent i also plans that, for every period t, he can ﬁnd
another plan b a and a terminal date T > t, such that
b a 2 Bi(p,q,)\ BT and a1[0,t] = b a1[0,t]
but also that the payoff he gets at the terminal node T with the plan b a is not too far from the
payoff he would get with the initial plan a.
The formal deﬁnition is as follows.
Deﬁnition 4.2. A plan a in the budget set Bi(p,q,) is said to be almost ﬁnite-time solvent if
for every period t ¾ 0 and every " > 0 there exists a subsequent period T > t and a plan b a such
that
b a 2 Bi(p,q,)\ BT, a1[0,t] = b a1[0,t] and i,T(p,b a) ¾ i,T(p,a) ".
When the default penalty is inﬁnite, our concept of almost ﬁnite-time solvent plans coin-
cides with the concept introduced by Levine and Zame (1996) of plans with ﬁnitely effective
debt.
Proposition 4.1. Assume that the default penalty is inﬁnite and consider a budget feasible
plan a 2 Bi(p,q,) with a ﬁnite utility Ui(x) < 1. The plan a is almost ﬁnite-time solvent if
and only if it has a ﬁnitely effective debt.
Proof of Proposition 4.1. Let a be a budget feasible plan, i.e., a 2 Bi(p,q,) with a ﬁnite utility
Ui(x) < 1. Since the default penalty is inﬁnite, agent i never plans to default and we get
i(p,a) = Ui(x).
It is obvious that if a is almost ﬁnite-time solvent then it has a ﬁnitely effective debt. The
converse deserves more details. Assume that the plan a has a ﬁnitely effective debt. Fix a
period t and " > 0. If we apply the deﬁnition to the period t, we get the existence of a period
T > t and a plan b a such that
b a 2 Bi(p,q,)\ BT and a1[0,t] = b a1[0,t].
12Unfortunately, we don’t know if Ui,T(b x) ¾ Ui,T(x)   ". However, we know that the utility





ui(, x()) ¶ ". (4.1)
Now, applying the deﬁnition of ﬁnitely effective debt for the period t0, there exist a period
T > t0 and a plan b a such that
b a 2 Bi(p,q,)\ BT and a1[0,t0] = b a1[0,t0].
Since T > t0 we can use (4.1) to get











We denote by Bi
?(p,q,) the set of all plans in Bi(p,q,) which are almost ﬁnite-time
solvent.
Deﬁnition 4.3. A competitive equilibrium with almost ﬁnite-time solvency for the economy E, is
a family of prices and delivery rates (p,q,) 2  and an allocation a = (ai)i2I with ai 2 A such
that conditions (b), (c) and (d) are satisﬁed together with
(a’) for every agent i, the plan ai is almost ﬁnite-time solvent and optimal among all almost
ﬁnite-time budget feasible plans, i.e.,
ai 2 di
?(p,q,) := fa 2 Bi
?(p,q,) : Prefi(p,a)\ Bi
?(p,q,) = ;g.
We denote by Eq?(E) the set of competitive equilibria with almost ﬁnite-time solvency
for the economy E. We propose to compare our equilibrium concept with those proposed in
Araujo et al. (2002) and Páscoa and Seghir (2008).
134.1 No default penalty
Observe that if default is not allowed or if there are default penalties for it, then Bi
?(p,q,)
may be a strict subset of Bi(p,q,). However, in the model proposed in Araujo et al. (2002),
any budget feasible allocation with a ﬁnite utility is ﬁnite-time solvent. This is a consequence
of the absence of default penalties or explicit economic punishments.
Proposition 4.2. Assume that there is no default penalty and let a = (x,,',d) be a plan in
the budget set Bi(p,q,). If Ui(x) is ﬁnite then a is almost ﬁnite-time solvent, i.e., a belongs
to Bi
?(p,q,).
Proof of Proposition 4.2. Fix an agent i and consider a plan a that is budget feasible, i.e.,
a 2 Bi(p,q,) with a ﬁnite utility, i.e.,
X
2D
ui(, x()) < 1.
Fix a period t ¾ 1 and " > 0. Since Ui(x) is ﬁnite, there exists T ¾ t +1 such that
X
2DT
ui(, x()) ¶ ".





a() if t() < T
(!i(),0,0, b d()) if t() = T
(0,0,0,0) if t() > T
where
8 2 DT, 8j 2 J, b d(, j) = D(p,, j)'( , j).
Observe that the plan b a is budget feasible, belongs to BT and satisﬁes
b a1[0,T 1] = a1[0,T 1].
In order to prove that the plan a is almost ﬁnite-time solvent, we need to compare Ui,T(b x)
14and Ui,T(x). Observe that










Since T  1 ¾ t, this implies that the plan a is almost ﬁnite-time solvent.
In general the two sets Eq(E) and Eq?(E) are not comparable. Actually, when there is no
loss of utility in case of default, both sets coincide.
Proposition 4.3. If there is no default penalty then (,a) is a competitive equilibrium if and
only if it is a competitive equilibrium with almost ﬁnite-time solvency, i.e., the sets Eq(E) and
Eq?(E) coincide.
Proof of Proposition 4.3. Let (,a) 2 Eq(E) be a competitive equilibrium. Fix an agent i 2 I.
In order to prove that ai belongs to the demand di
?(), it is sufﬁcient to prove that ai is an
almost ﬁnite-time solvent plan. Since a is feasible we have xi() ¶ 
(). From (A.3), we get
that Ui(xi) is ﬁnite. The desired result follows from Proposition 4.2.
Now let (,a) 2 Eq?(E) be a competitive equilibrium with almost ﬁnite-time solvency. We
only have to prove that ai belongs to di() for each agent i. Fix an agent i and assume by
contradiction that there exists a plan a in Bi() such that Ui(x) > Ui(xi). If Ui(x) is ﬁnite
then, applying Proposition 4.2, we get that a 2 Bi
?(): contradiction. Therefore, we must
have Ui(x) = 1, implying that there exists T ¾ 1 such that
Ui,T(x) > Ui(xi).





a() if t() ¶ T
(!i(),0,0, b d()) if t() = T +1
(0,0,0,0) if t() > T +1
where
8 2 DT+1, 8j 2 J, b d(, j) = D(p,, j)'( , j).
15Since the plan b a is budget feasible and has a ﬁnite horizon, it is almost ﬁnite-time solvent and
belongs to Bi
?(p,q,). Moreover we have




This contradicts the optimality of xi in Bi
?(p,q,).
4.2 -moderate default penalties
Before introducing the main condition imposed on default penalties by Páscoa and Seghir
(2008), we need to introduce some notations. For each asset j and node , we denote by







Observe that under Assumption 3.2, we have M(, j) < 1. Finally, for every node  6= 0 we
let
H(, j) = M( , j) sup
p2(L)





The quantity H(, j) is the maximum amount in real terms that an agent may default on asset
j if his plan is feasible. The proof of the following proposition is straightforward and omitted.
Proposition 4.4. If a in A is a plan physically feasible and (p,q,) in  is a process of prices
and delivery rates, then for each node  and each asset j, we have
'(, j) ¶ M(, j) and

V(p,, j)'( , j)  d(, j)
+
¶ H(, j).
Páscoa and Seghir (2008) introduced the concept of -moderate default penalties. Fix a
process  = (())2D with () 2 (1,1)J.
Deﬁnition 4.4. Default penalties are said -moderate with respect to utility functions, if for each









In other words, when default penalties are -moderate then, sometime in the future, the
penalty associated with a maximal default for a feasible plan, is less than the utility from
consuming the current endowment.





i(, j)(, j)H(, j) ¶ ui(,!i()).
We let A be the set of all of processes a in A satisfying
9 ¾ 0, 8 2 D, 8j 2 J, '(, j) ¶ (, j)M(, j).
A plan a belonging to A is said to be -constrained. We denote by Bi
(p,q,) the set of all
plans in Bi(p,q,) which are -constrained.
Remark 4.2. Observe that the constraints imposed in the deﬁnition of A are not binding at
equilibrium since (, j) > 1. Actually, if a in AI is a physically feasible allocation then each
plan ai is automatically -constrained for each i, more precisely, we have
8 2 D, 8j 2 J, '(, j) < (, j)M(, j).
Deﬁnition 4.5. An -constrained competitive equilibrium for the economy E, is a family of prices
and delivery rates (p,q,) 2  and an allocation a = (ai)i2I with ai 2 A such that conditions
(b), (c) and (d) are satisﬁed together with
(a) for every agent i, the plan ai is -constrained budget feasible and optimal among all -
constrained budget feasible plans, i.e.,
ai 2 di
(p,q,) = fa 2 Bi
(p,q,) : Prefi(p,a)\ Bi
(p,q,) 6= ;g.
We denote by Eq(E) the set of -constrained competitive equilibria for the economy E. In
general the two sets Eq(E) and Eq?(E) are not comparable. Actually, when default penalties
are -moderate, the set Eq?(E) is a subset of Eq(E).
Proposition 4.5. If default penalties are -moderate, then every competitive equilibrium with
almost ﬁnite-time solvency is actually an -constrained competitive equilibrium, i.e.,
Eq?(E)  Eq(E).
Proof of Proposition 4.5. Let (,a) 2 Eq?(E) be a competitive equilibrium with almost ﬁnite-
time solvency. Fix an agent i 2 I. Since ai is physically feasible, we already know that it is
-constrained, i.e., ai 2 Bi
(). Let us prove that ai belongs to the demand di
(). Assume
by way of contradiction that there exists an -constrained plan a in Bi
(), " > 0 and T1 2 N
satisfying
8T ¾ T1, i,T(p,a) > i,T(p,ai)+". (4.3)
17Since ai is physically feasible, we have
8 2 D, xi() ¶ 
().







Therefore, there exists T2 ¾ T1 such that
8T ¾ T2, i,T(p,ai)+" > i(p,ai). (4.4)
Combining (4.3) and (4.4) we get
8T ¾ T2, i,T(p,a) > i(p,ai).
Let  2 (0,1) and pose
e a = a +(1 )ai.
Observe that we still have
8T ¾ T2, i,T(p,e a) > i(p,ai).
Recall that there exists  ¾ 0 such that
8 2 D, 8j 2 J, '(, j) ¶ (, j)M(, j).
Recall that ai is physically feasible, implying that 'i(, j) ¶ M(, j) for each node  and each
asset j. It then follows that





Since (, j) > 1, we can choose  close enough to 0 such that
8 2 D, e '(, j) ¶ (, j)M(, j).

















e a() if t() ¶ T3  1
(!i(),0,0, b d()) if t() = T3
(0,0,0,0) if t() > T3
where
8 2 DT3, 8j 2 J, b d(, j) = D(p,, j)e '( , j).
By construction, the plan b a is ﬁnite-time solvent and budget feasible. In particular, it is almost
ﬁnite-time solvent and belongs to Bi
?(). We propose to compare the payoffs of b a and ai.












¾ i,T3 1(p,e a) > i(p,ai).
This contradicts the optimality of ai in Bi
?(p,q,).
5 Myopic agents and equilibrium existence
It was proved in Levine and Zame (1996) that ﬁnitely effective debt constraints are compat-
ible with equilibrium when the default penalty is inﬁnite and no collateral is required. A
natural question concerns the possible extension of this existence result to our framework
when default penalties are not inﬁnite and collateral requirements are not zero. The answer
is yes, provided that agents are myopic with respect to default penalties as deﬁned hereafter.








i(, j)H(, j) = 0.
Remark 5.1. Assuming myopic agents with respect to default penalties is a very mild assump-
tion since it is automatically satisﬁed for every standard economy.
Observe that if default penalties are moderate with respect to utility functions then, for


















19It then follows from Assumption (A.3) that every agent is myopic with respect to default
penalties.
Proposition 5.1. If default penalties are moderate then every agent is myopic with respect to
them.
When agents are myopic with respect to default penalties, any budget and physically
feasible plan a 2 Bi(p,q,)\Fi is actually almost ﬁnite-time solvent. This result will turn out
to be crucial when proving existence of equilibrium.
Proposition 5.2. If agent i is myopic with respect to default penalties, then every budget and





Proof of Proposition 5.2. Fix an agent i and consider a plan a that is budget and physically
feasible, i.e., a 2 Bi(p,q,) \ Fi. Fix a period t ¾ 1 and " > 0. Since the allocation a is




ui(, x()) < 1.






















a() if t() < T
(!i(),0,0, b d()) if t() = T
(0,0,0,0) if t() > T
where
8 2 DT, 8j 2 J, b d(, j) = D(p,, j)'( , j).
20Observe that the plan b a satisﬁes
b a 2 Bi(p,q,)\ BT and b a1[0,T 1] = a1[0,T 1].
Moreover,



































Since T  1 ¾ t, this implies that the plan a is almost ﬁnite-time solvent.
The main result of this paper is the following generalization of Theorem 2 in Araujo et al.
(2002) and Theorem 4.1 in Páscoa and Seghir (2008). We prove that, in order to rule out
Ponzi schemes, it is not necessary to assume that default penalties are moderate with respect
to utility functions. It is sufﬁcient to assume that every agent is myopic with respect to default
penalties.
Theorem 5.1. If every agent is myopic with respect to default penalties then a competitive equi-
librium with almost ﬁnite-time solvency exists.
As a direct consequence of Proposition 4.3, we obtain the main existence result in Araujo
et al. (2002, Theorem 2) as a corollary of Theorem 5.1.
Corollary 5.1 (Araujo et al. (2002)). If there is no default penalty then there exists a competitive
equilibrium, i.e., Eq(E) 6= ;.
As a direct consequence of Proposition 4.5, we obtain the existence result in Páscoa and
Seghir (2008, Theorem 4.1) as a corollary of Theorem 5.1.
Corollary 5.2 (Páscoa and Seghir (2008)). If default penalties are moderate with respect to
utility functions then there exists a constrained competitive equilibrium, i.e., the set Eq(E) 6= ;.
21Remark 5.2. Páscoa and Seghir (2008) claim to prove that not only the set Eq(E) is non-
empty when default penalties are -moderate, but also that the set Eq(E) is non-empty. How-
ever, in order to get existence of e T in the arguments of the proof of their main result (Páscoa
and Seghir (2008, Theorem 4.1, p. 15)), they implicitly consider -constrained plans.
6 Proof of Theorem 5.1
Fix  2 T with  > 0. We denote by A the set
8 2 D, t() >  =) a() = 0.
Recall that B denotes the set of plans a 2 A satisfying the additional condition
8 2 D, t() =  =) '() = 0.
Given a process (p,q,) 2 , we denote by Bi,(p,q,) the set deﬁned by
Bi,(p,q,) = Bi(p,q,)\ B.
Deﬁnition 6.1. A competitive equilibrium for the truncated economy E is a family of prices and
delivery rates  = (p,q,) 2  and an allocation a = (ai)i2I with ai 2 B such that
(a) for every agent i, the plan ai is optimal, i.e.,
ai 2 di,(p,q,) = argmaxfi,(p,a) : a 2 Bi,(p,q,)g, (6.1)
























(d) deliveries match up to period , i.e., for all  2 D nf0g and all j 2 J,
X
i2I




22Remark 6.1. Observe that if a plan a belongs to B, then i,(p,a) and i(p,a) coincide for
every price process p.
Remark 6.2. Observe that if (,a) is a competitive equilibrium for the truncated economy
E, then without any loss of generality, we can assume that q() = 0 and () = 0 for every
terminal node  2 D.
It is claimed in Páscoa and Seghir (2008) that a competitive equilibrium for every trun-
cated economy E exists, and that commodity prices are uniformly bounded away from 0. For
the sake of completeness, we postpone to Appendix A.2 a simple proof of this result.
Proposition 6.1. There exists a process m = (m())2D of strictly positive numbers m() > 0









 ¾ m() at every node  2 D 1.
For each  2 T with  ¾ 1, we let (,a) be a competitive equilibrium for the economy
E where  = (p,q,) and a = (ai,)i2I. Each process  belongs to cl which is
weakly compact as a product of compact sets. Passing to a subsequence if necessary, we can
assume that the sequence ()2T converges to a process  = (p,q,) in cl. Following








 ¾ m() > 0. In particular, for each
period t and every plan a 2 A, the payoff i,t(p,a) is well-deﬁned.
By feasibility at each node , we get for each j
xi,() ¶ 
(), 'i,(, j) ¶ M(, j) and i,(, j) ¶ M(, j).
This implies that the sequence (xi,(),'i,(),i,())2T is uniformly bounded. By op-
timality, the delivery di,(, j) is always lower than V(p,, j)'i,( , j) and therefore the
sequence (di,())2T is uniformly bounded. Passing to a subsequence if necessary, we can
assume that for each i, the sequence (ai,)2T converges to a process ai 2 A.
We claim that (,a) is a competitive equilibrium with almost ﬁnite-time solvency for
the economy E. It is straightforward to check that each plan ai belongs to the budget set
Bi(p,q,) and that the feasibility conditions (2.5), (2.6), (2.7) and (2.8) are satisﬁed. Apply-
ing Proposition 5.2, we get that the plan ai is almost ﬁnite-time solvent. We propose now to
prove that ai is optimal among almost ﬁnite-time solvent plans, i.e., Prefi(p,ai)\Bi
?(p,q,) is
empty. Assume by way of contradiction that there exists a plan a in the budget set Bi
?(p,q,),
" > 0 and T1 2 N satisfying
8T ¾ T1, i,T(p,a) > i,T(p,ai)+". (6.6)
Since ai is physically feasible, we have
8 2 D, xi() ¶ 
().







It follows that there exists T2 ¾ T1 such that




Since the plan a is almost ﬁnite-time solvent, there exists T > T2 and b a in the truncated
budget set Bi(p,q,)\ BT such that




Combining (6.6), (6.7) and (6.8) we get




We let  i be the correspondence from A to AT deﬁned by
8a 2 A,  i(a) =
§






Let Fi be the correspondence from A to AT deﬁned by
8(,a) 2 A, Fi(,a) = Bi,T()\ i(a).
Following the arguments in Páscoa and Seghir (2008), we have the following continuity result.
Lemma 6.1. The correspondence Fi is lower semi-continuous for product topologies on A.
Observe that
b a 2 Fi((p,q,),ai).






(pn,qn,n) = (pTn,qTn,Tn), ai
n = ai,Tn.
24Since Fi is lower semi-continuous, there exists  large enough such that
b a 2 Fi((p,q,),ai
).
In particular we have





This contradicts the optimality of ai
.3
We have thus proved that for each i, the plan ai is almost-ﬁnite solvent and satisﬁes
Prefi(p,ai)\ Bi
?(p,q,) = ;.
This means that ai belongs to the demand set di
?(). We already proved that all markets clear.
This means that (,a) is a competitive equilibrium with almost ﬁnite-time solvency.
7 Conclusion
This paper shows that it is possible to adapt the approach of restricting action plans to have
ﬁnite effective debt, introduced in the work of Levine and Zame (1996), to models with
default and collateralized promises. Working in this direction we introduce in the framework
developed by Araujo et al. (2002) and Páscoa and Seghir (2008) the concept of almost ﬁnite-
time solvency and show that the restrictions imposed in these two papers to rule out Ponzi
schemes imply that plans are almost ﬁnite-time solvent. We also deﬁne the notion of what
we term equilibrium with almost ﬁnite-time solvency and provide sufﬁcient conditions for its
existence. It turns out that the existence results in Araujo et al. (2002) and Páscoa and Seghir
(2008) can be derived as straightforward corollaries of our existence result.
A Appendix
We collect in this appendix the proofs of some technical results.
A.1 Continuity on order intervals
Assumptions (A.2) and (A.3) imply that when restricted to the order interval [0,
], the func-
tion Ui is weakly continuous.
Proposition A.1. The function Ui is weakly continuous on [0,
i].
3Recall that ((p,q,),a) is a competitive equilibrium of the truncated economy E T.
25For the sake of completeness, we give the straightforward proof of this result.





Let (xn)n2N be a sequence of consumption processes in [0,
], weakly converging to x.4 Fix
" > 0. From Assumption (A.3), the utility Ui(
































From Assumption (A.2), each utility function ui(,) is continuous. Since (xn)n2N converges









Combining (A.1) and (A.2), we get the desired result.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 6.1
We consider the following modiﬁcation of the normalization of the default penalty. For every






















" (,a) = Ui,(x) W i,
" (,a).
When the process  belongs to cl, the functions (W i,t
" )t¾1 are well-deﬁned for every " > 0.
A pair (,a) where  2  and a = (ai)i2I is an allocation with ai 2 B, is said to be a
competitive equilibrium of the truncated economy E
" if market clearing conditions (6.2),
(6.3), (6.4) and (6.5) are satisﬁed and the optimality condition (6.1) is replaced by
4Remember that the weak topology on X is metrizable.
26(a") for every agent i, the plan ai is optimal with respect to i,
" , i.e.,
ai 2 di,
" (p,q,) = argmaxfi,
" (,a) : a 2 Bi,()g.









 is never 0. It is now very easy to adapt the arguments in Araujo et al. (2002) and
prove that a competitive equilibrium (,a) for the truncated economy E
" exists for any " > 0
where  2 cl. Since utility functions are strictly increasing, we must have p() 2 RL
++ for
each node  2 D. We propose to exhibit an exogenous lower bound m() for every node
 with t() < . Fix a node  2 D 1,  > 0 and an agent i 2 I. Let e ai
 be the plan in B






ai() if  62 fg[+
(xi()+ f (,)1L,i(),'()+1J,di()) if  = 
(xi(),i(),'i(), e di






















and for every j,
e di
() = di(, j)+D(p,, j).
In other words, we propose to short-sell at node  an additional quantity  > 0 of each asset j
and to increase consumption of each good by f (,) units. At each successor node  2 +,
we propose to “fully" default on additional short-sales. By doing so, at node  we get an








 units of accounts from short-selling. In order to satisfy the
constraint imposed by the collateral requirements, we should purchase the bundle C() at








 ¾ p()C(). In other words, if f (,) ¾ 0 then the plan e ai

belongs to the budget set Bi,() for every  > 0. We propose to compare the payoffs of the




)  Ui,(xi) = ui(, xi()+ f (,)1L) ui(, xi()).
Moreover, since for each  2 +

































Let us denote by i,










and let us denote by r+ui(, xi()) the vector in RL














































































































 = f (,) ¶ g().








5The existence of r
+
` ui(, xi()) is a consequence of the concavity of ui(,). The strict monotonicity of ui(,)
implies that r
+
` ui(, xi()) is strictly positive.
28Consider now the sequence ("n)n2N deﬁned by




For each n 2 N, there exists an equilibrium (n,an) of the truncated economy E
"n. Following
standard arguments, there exists a process  2 cl of prices and delivery rates and a process
a of plans ai 2 B such that, passing to a subsequence if necessary, the sequence (n,an)n2N








 ¾ m() for every non-terminal node








 ¾ m(), in particular p() > 0 for each
 2 D.6 Therefore the payoff i,(p,a) is well-deﬁned for every plan a 2 B. It is now
standard to prove that the limit (,a) is actually a competitive equilibrium of the truncated
economy E.
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